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Abstract
Theories of a “new imperialism” assume that world capitalism in the 21st century is still made
up of “domestic capitals” and that distinct national economies and world political dynamics
are driven by US efforts to offset the decline in hegemony amidst heightened inter-imperialist
rivalry. These theories ignore empirical evidence on the transnationalization of capital and the
increasingly salient role of transnational state apparatuses in imposing capitalist domination
beyond the logic of the inter-state system. I argue here that US interventionism is not a departure from capitalist globalization but a response to its crisis. The class relations of global capitalism are now so deeply internalized within every nation-state that the classical image of
imperialism as a relation of external domination is outdated. The end of the extensive enlargement of capitalism is the end of the imperialist era of world capitalism. The implacable logic
of global accumulation is now largely internal to the complex of fractious political institutions
through which ruling groups attempt to manage those relations. We need a theory of capitalist
expansion – of the political processes and the institutions through which such expansion takes
place, the class relations and spatial dynamics it involves.
Mas all de la teoría del imperialismo: capitalismo global y estado transnacional
Las teorías del nuevo imperialismo asumen que el capitalismo mundial del siglo 21 se compone aún de “capitales nacionales” y economías nacionales distintas y que la dinámica política
internacional están dirigidas por el esfuerzo de US para contrarrestar su declive hegemónico
como consecuencia de la rivalidad internacional. Estas teorías ignoran la evidencia empírica
acerca de la transnacionalización del capital y el papel crecientemente preponderante de los
mecanismos del Estado transnacional para imponer una dominación capitalista más allá de la
lógica del sistema Interestatal. Aquí argumento que el intervencionismo americano no es una
desviación de la globalización capitalista sino una respuesta a su crisis. Las relaciones de clase
del capitalismo global están hoy tan profundamente internalizadas dentro de cada Estado
nación que la imagen clásica del imperialismo como una relación de dominación externa está
pasada de moda. El fin de la ampliación extensiva del capitalismo es el fin de la era imperialista del
capitalismo mundial. La lógica implacable de la acumulación global es ahora principalmente
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007
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interna al complejo de instituciones políticas fragmentadas a través de las que los grupos de
poder tratan de gestionar esas relaciones. Necesitamos una teoría de la expansión capitalistade los procesos políticos y las instituciones a cuyo través se produce esa expansión, de las nuevas relaciones entre clase y dinámicas espaciales.
A travers la frontière de la théorie de l’impérialisme: le capitalisme global et l’état
transnational
Les théories d’un ‘nouvel impérialisme’ supposent que le capitalisme mondial au 21ème siècle se
compose toujours des capitaux domestiques et des économies nationaux distinctes. Ils supposent aussi que la dynamique politique mondiale est mené par l’effort américain pour reconstituer sa proper hégémonie dans la rivalité intensifiée interimpérialiste. Ces théories ignorent
l’évidence empirique sur la mondialisation du capital et le rôle de plus en plus saillant des
appareillages transnationaux d’état d’imposer la domination capitaliste au-delà de la logique
du système transnational. Je constate du fait ici que l’interventionnisme des Etats-Unis n’est
pas un départ de la mondialisation capitaliste mais, contrairement, elle est une réponse à sa
crise. Les relations de classe du capitalisme mondial sont maintenant si profondément internalisées dans chaque Ètat-nation que l’image classique de l’impérialisme comme relation de la
domination externe est démodée. La fin de l’agrandissement étendu du capitalisme est la fin de
l’ère impérialiste du capitalisme du monde. La logique implacable de l’accumulation globale
est maintenant en grande partie interne au complexe des corps politiques grincheux par
lesquels les groupes puissants essaient de contrôler ces relations. Nous avons besoin d’une
théorie d’expansion capitaliste – des processus politiques et des institutions par lesquels une
telle expansion a lieu, des relations de classe et de la dynamique spatiale qu’elle implique.
Keywords
globalization, imperialism, capitalism, transnational state, David Harvey

Introduction
Theories of a “new imperialism” that have proliferated in the years following
the events of September 2001 assume that the United States has set about to
extend global empire and offset the decline in its hegemony amidst heightened inter-imperialist rivalry. Some argue that unilateral US interventionism belies earlier claims that we are moving towards a globalized world order
and refute misguided theories of globalization.1 These theories rest on a
crustaceous bed of assumptions that need to be peeled back if we are to get at
the root of 21st century global social and political dynamics. Grounded in the
classical statements of Lenin and Hilferding, they are based on the assumption of a world of rival national capitals and economies, conflict among core
1)

See, e.g., Pozo 2006; Henwood 2003.
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capitalist powers, the exploitation by these powers of peripheral regions, and
a nation-state centered framework for analyzing global dynamics. Hilferding, in his classic study on imperialism, Finance Capital, argued that national
capitalist monopolies turn to the state for assistance in acquiring international markets and that this state intervention inevitably leads to intense
political-economy rivalries among nation-states.2 Lenin, in his 1917 pamphlet
Imperialism: The Latest Stage of Capitalism, stressed the rise of national
financial-industrial combines that struggle to divide and redivide the world
amongst themselves through their respective nation-states. The rivalry
among these competing national capitals led to inter-state competition, military conflict and war among the main capitalist countries.
Hilferding, Lenin, and others analyzing the world of the early 20th century established this Marxist analytical framework of rival national capitals
that was carried by subsequent political economists into the latter 20th century via theories of dependency and the world system, radical international
relations theory, studies of US intervention, and so on. This outdated framework of competing national capitals continues to inform observers of world
dynamics in the early 21st century. The following assertion by Klare is typical: “By geopolitics or geopolitical competition, I mean the contention
between great powers and aspiring great powers for control over territory,
resources, and important geographical positions, such as ports and harbors,
canals, river systems, oases, and other sources of wealth and influence. Today
we are seeing a resurgence of unabashed geopolitical ideology among the
leadership cadres of the major powers . . . the best way to see what’s happening
today in Iraq and elsewhere is through a geopolitical prism.”3 Such thinking
provides the scaffolding for a torrent of “new imperialism” literature that has
appeared since 2001.4
But capitalism has changed fundamentally since the days of Lenin, Hilferding, and Bukharin. We have entered a qualitatively new transnational stage
in the ongoing evolution of world capitalism, which is marked by a number
of fundamental shifts in the capitalist system, among them: the rise of truly
transnational capital and the integration of every country into a new global
production and financial system; the appearance of a new transnational
2)

Hilderding 1910, p. 322.
Klare 2003, pp. 51–52.
4)
See, inter-alia, Foster 2003, 2006; Wood 2003; Harvey 2005; Pozo 2006; Kiely 2006;
Henwood 2003; Brenner 2002; Arrighi 2005; Gowan 1999; Klare 2003; Bello 2005;
Monthly Review 2003).
3)
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capitalist class (TCC), a class group grounded in new global markets and
circuits of accumulation, rather than national markets and circuits; the rise
of transnational state (TNS) apparatuses, and the appearance of novel relations of power and inequality in global society. The dynamics of this emerging stage in world capitalism cannot be understood through the lens of
nation-state centric thinking. This is not to say that the nation-state is no
longer important but that the system of nation-states as discrete interacting
units – the inter-state system – is no longer the organizing principle of capitalist development, or the primary institutional framework that shapes social
and class forces and political dynamics.5

The Myth of National Economies and the Reality of Transnational
Capital
The hallmark of “new imperialism” theories is the assumption that world
capitalism in the 21st century is made up of “domestic capitals” and distinct
national economies that interact with one another, and a concomitant “realist” analysis of world politics as driven by the pursuit by governments of their
“national interest.” Gowan, for instance, in his oft-cited study The Global
Gamble: Washington’s Bid for World Dominance,6 refers incessantly to an
“American capitalism,” a “German capitalism,” an “Italian capitalism,” a
“French capitalism,” and so on, each a discernible and discrete economic system featuring distinctly organized national capitalist classes involved in sets
of national competitive relationships. In another leading treatise on the “new
imperialism,” Empire of Capital, Ellen Meiksins Wood asserts that “the
national organization of capitalist economies has remained stubbornly
persistent.”7
Are we to assume, as Wood, Gowan, and others do, although they provide
not a shred of empirical evidence, that capital remains organized, as it was in
earlier moments of the world capitalist system, along national lines and that
the development of capital has stopped frozen in its nation-state form? The
inter-state/nation-state framework obliges “new imperialism” scholars to

5)

For elaborations on these propositions, see, inter-alia, Robinson 2006b, 2007, 2005a,
2005b, 2004, 2003, 2002, 1996.
6)
Gowan 1999, and see also 2003.
7)
Wood 2003, p. 23.
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advance this unproblematized notion of “national interests” to explain global
political dynamics. What does “national interests” mean? Marxists have historically rejected notions of “national interests” as an ideological subterfuge
for class and social group interests. What is a “national economy”? Is it a
country with a closed market? Protected territorially-based production circuits? The predominance of national capitals? An insulated national financial system? No capitalist country in the world fits this description.
There is a mounting body of empirical evidence that demonstrates the
transnationalization of capital. This evidence strongly suggests that the giant
conglomerates of the Fortune 500 ceased to be “US” corporations in the
latter part of the 20th century and increasingly represented transnational
capitalist groups.8 This reality of transnationalization can no longer be
disputed, nor can its significance for macro-social theories and for analysis of
world political-economic dynamics. One need only glean daily headlines
from the world media to discover endless reams of anecdotal evidence to
complement the accumulation of systematic data on transnationalization.
IBM’s chair and CEO, Samuel Palmisano, affirms in a June 2006 article in
the Financial Times of London, for instance, that use of the very word
“multinational corporation” suggests “how antiquated our thinking about it
is.” He continues:
The emerging business model of the 21st century is not, in fact ‘multinational’. This new
kind of organization – at IBM we call it ‘the globally integrated enterprise’ – is very different in its structure and operations. . . . In the multinational model, companies built
local production capacity within key markets, while performing other tasks on a global
basis . . . American multinationals such as General Motors, Ford and IBM built plants
and established local workforce policies in Europe and Asia, but kept research and development and product design principally in the ‘home country’.9

The spread of multinationals in this way constituted internationalization, in
contrast to more recent transnationalization:
The globally integrated enterprise, in contrast, fashions its strategy, management and
operations to integrate production – and deliver value to clients – worldwide. That has
been made possible by shared technologies and shared business standards, built on top

8)

For summaries and assessments of this evidence, see Robinson 2004; Sklair 2001, 2002;
Kentor 2005; Kentor and Jang 2003; UNCTAD various years; Carroll and Carson 2003;
Carroll and Fennema 2002; Dicken 2003.
9)
Palmisano 2006, p.19.
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of a global information technology and communications infrastructure. . . . Today, innovation is inherently global.10

In turn, IBM is one of the largest investors in India, which has become a
major platform for transnational service provision to the global economy. If
the decentralization and dispersal around the world of manufacturing processes represented the leading edge of an earlier wave of globalization, the
current wave involves the decentralization and global dispersal of such services as data processing, insurance claims, phone operators, call centers,
software production, marketing, journalism and publishing, advertising,
and banking – which are now undertaken through complex webs of outsourcing, subcontracting and transnational alliances among firms. IBM went
from 9,000 employees in India in 2004 to 43,000 (out of 329,000 worldwide) in 2006, and this does not include thousands of workers in local firms
that have been subcontracted by IBM or by Indian IBM partner firms.11
Some of IBM’s growth in India has come from mergers between IBM and
companies previously launched by Indian investors as outsourcing firms,
such as Dagsh eSErvices of New Delhi, which went from 6,000 to 20,000
back-office employees after its merger with IBM. In this way, and in countless
other examples across the globe, national capitalist groups become swept up
into global circuits of accumulation and into TCC formation.
My global capitalism approach shares little or nothing with Karl Kautsky’s
earlier “ultraimperialism” or “superimperialism” thesis. Kautsy, in his 1914
essay Ultra-Imperialism,12 assumed capital would remain national in its
essence and suggested that national capitals would collude internationally
instead of compete, whereas my theory on the TCC emphasizes that conflict
among capitals is endemic to the system but that such competition takes on
new forms in the age of globalization not necessarily expressed as national
rivalry. The TCC thesis does not suggest there are no longer national and
regional capitals, or that the TCC is internally unified, free of conflict, and
consistently acts as a coherent political actor. Nonetheless, the TCC has
established itself as a class group without a national identity and in competition with nationally-based capitals. There is conflict between national and
transnational fractions of capital. Moreover, rivalry and competition are

10)
11)
12)

Palmisano 2006, p. 19.
Rai 2006.
Kautsy 1914.
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fierce among transnational conglomerations that turn to numerous institutional channels, including multiple national states, to pursue their interests.
For instance, IBM and its local Indian shareholders and partners compete for
service outsourcing contracts, explains Rai, with Cognizant Technology
Solutions, a company based in Teaneck, New Jersey and of IBM’s chief rivals
in the Indian subcontinent. The rivalry between IBM and Cognizant cannot
be considered competition between national capitals of distinct countries
and both groups turn to the US and the Indian state to seek advantage over
competitors.

Reification and Theoreticism in “New Imperialism” Theories:
The Antinomies of David Harvey
Most “new imperialism” theorists acknowledge to varying degrees that
changes have taken place, and particularly, that capital has become more
global. Yet capital in these accounts has not transnationalized; it has “internationalized.” These accounts are concerned with explaining the international order, which by definition places the focus on inter-state dynamics
exclusive of the trans-national. This need to accommodate the reality of
transnationalizing capital within a nation-state centric framework for analyzing world political dynamics leads “new imperialism” theories to a dualism of the economic and the political.
David Harvey, in perhaps the landmark treatise among this literature, The
New Imperialism, argues that capital is economic and globalizes but states are
political and pursue a self-interested territorial logic.13 Harvey’s theory starts
with the notion that
the fundamental point is to see the territorial and the capitalist logic of power as distinct
from each other. . . . The relation between these two logics should be seen, therefore, as
problematic and often contradictory . . . rather than as functional or one-sided. This dialectical relation sets the stage for an analysis of capitalist imperialism in terms of the
intersection of these two distinctive but intertwined logics of power.14

Harvey’s is not, however, a dialectical but a mechanical approach. The different dimensions of social reality in the dialectical approach do not have an
“independent” status insofar as each aspect of reality is constituted by, and is
13)
14)

Harvey 2003.
Harvey 2003, pp. 29–30.
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constitutive of, a larger whole of which it is an internal element. Distinct
dimensions of social reality may be analytically distinct yet are internally
interpenetrated and mutually constitutive of each other as internal elements of
a more encompassing process, so that, for example, the economic/capital and
the political/state are internal to capitalist relations.
It is remarkable that Harvey proposes such a separation since the history
of modern critical thought – from Polanyi to Poulantzas and Gramsci, among
others, not to mention 50 years of historical materialist theorizing on the
state – has demonstrated both the formal (apparent) separation of the economic and the political under the capitalist mode of production and the illusion that such a separation is organic or real.15 This separation has its
genealogy in the rise of the market and its apparently “pure” economic compulsion. This separation appears in social thought with the breakup of political economy, the rise of classical economics and bourgeois social science,
and disciplinary fragmentation.16 Such a separation of the economic from
the political was a hallmark of the structural functionalism that dominated
much of mid-20th century social science. Structural functionalism separated
distinct spheres of the social totality and conferred a functional autonomy to
each subsphere which was seen as externally related to other subspheres in a
way similar to Harvey’s notion of separate state and capital logics that may or
may not coincide.
Harvey offers no explicit conception of the state but he acknowledges that
state behavior has “depended on how the state has been constituted and by
whom.”17 Yet dual logics of state and capital ignore the real-world policymaking process in which the state extends backward, is grounded in the
forces of civil society, and is fused in a myriad of ways with capital itself. It is
incumbent to ask in what ways transnational social forces may influence a
reconstitution of state institutions. To the extent that civil society – social
forces – and capital are transnationalizing our analysis of the state cannot
remain frozen at a nation-state level. The essential problematic that should
concern us in attempting to explain phenomena associated with the “new
imperialism” is the political management – or rule – of global capitalism.
The theoretical gauntlet is how to understand the exercise of political domination in relation to the institutions available to dominant groups and sets of

15)
16)
17)

For a discussion, see Robinson 1996.
See, inter-alia, Therborn 1985, 1999; Zeitlin 2000.
Harvey 2003, p. 91.
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changing historical relations among social forces – that is, how are the political and the economic articulated in the current era? This requires a conception of agency and institutions.
But instead of offering an ontology of agency and how it operates through
historically constituted institutions, much of the “new imperialism” literature reifies these institutions. Institutions are but institutionalized – that is,
codified – patterns of interaction among social forces that structure different
aspects of their material relations. When we explain global dynamics in terms
of institutions that have an existence or agency independent of social forces
we are reifying these institutions. Critical state theories and Gramscian IPE18
have taught us, despite their limitations, that the story starts – and ends –
with historically situated social forces as collective agents. To critique a
nation-state framework of analysis as I do, is not, as my critics claim19 to dismiss the nation-state but to dereify it. Reifying categories leads to realist
analyses of state power and the inter-state system. Realism presumes that the
world economy is divided up into distinct national economies that interact
with one another. Each national economy is a billiard ball banging back and
forth on each other. This billiard image is then applied to explain global
political dynamics in terms of nation-states as discrete interacting units (the
inter-state system).
The state, says Harvey, in reverting to the realist approach, “struggles
toassert its interests and achieve its goals in the world at large.”20 But Harvey
does not stop with this reification of the state. He introduces an additional
territorial reification, so that territorial relations become immanent to social
relations. “The wealth and well-being of particular territories are augmented
at the expense of others,” writes Harvey.21 This is a remarkably reified image –
“territories” rather than social groups have “wealth” (accumulated values)
and enjoy “well being.” Harvey gives space in this way an independent existence as a social/political force in the form of territory in order to advance
his thesis of the “new imperialism.” It is not how social forces are organized
both in space and through institutions that is the focus. Rather, for Harvey,
territory acquires a social existence of its own, an agentic logic. We are told
that “territorial entities” engage in practices of production, commerce, and

18)
19)
20)
21)

See inter-alia Cox 1987; Simon 1991.
See inter-alia, Pozo 2006; Kiely 2006.
Harvey 2003, p. 26.
Harvey 2003, p. 32.
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so on. Do “territorial entities” really do these things? Or is it not that in the
real world, individuals and social groups engage in production, commerce,
and so on? And they do so via institutions through which they organize,
systematize, and demarcate their activities as agents. Social groups became
aggregated and organized in the modern era through the particular
institutional form of the territorial-based nation state. But this particular
institutional form does not acquire a life of its own and neither is it immutable. Nation-states continue to exist but their nature and meaning evolve
as social relations and structures become transformed; particular, as they
transnationalize.
Drawing on insights from Lafebvre, Marx, Luxemburg, and others, Harvey
earlier introduced the highly fertile notion of spatial (or spatial-temporal)
fixes to understand how capital momentarily resolves contradictions
(particularly, crises of overaccumulation) in one place by displacing them
to other places through geographic expansion and spatial reorganization.
Following Marx’ famous observation that the expanded accumulation of
capital involves the progressive “annihilation of space through time,” he also
coined the term “time-space compression” in reference to globalization as a
process involving a new burst of time-space compression in the world capitalist system.22
But “places” have no existence or meaning in and of themselves. It is people living in particular spaces that do this dis-placing (literally), these spatiotemporal fixes. The “asymmetric exchange relations” that are at the heart of
Harvey’s emphasis on the territorial basis of the “new imperialism” must be
for Harvey territorial exchange relations. But not only that: they must be
nation-state territorial exchanges. But exchange relations are social relations,
exchanges among particular social groups. There is nothing in the concept of
asymmetric exchanges that by fiat gives them a territorial expression; no reason to assume that uneven exchanges are necessarily exchanges that take place
between distinct territories, much less specifically between distinct nationstates. That they do or do not acquire such an expression is one of historical,
empirical, and conjunctural analysis. Certainly spatial relations among social
forces have historically been mediated in large part by territory; spatial relations have been territorially-defined relations. But this territorialization is in
no way immanent to social relations and may well be fading in significance as
globalization advances.

22)

Harvey 1982, 1990.
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Any theory of globalization must address the matter of place and space,
including changing spatial relations among social forces and how social
relations are spatialized. This has not been satisfactorily accomplished,
despite a spate of theoretical proposition, ranging from Castell’s “space of
flows” replacing the “space of place.”23 and Giddens “time-space distanciation” as the “lifting” of social relations from territorial place and their stretching around the globe in ways that may eliminate territorial friction.24 This
notion of ongoing and novel reconfigurations of time and social space is central to a number of globalization theories. It in turn points to the larger theoretical issue of the relationship of social structure to space, the notion of
space as the material basis for social practices, and the changing relationship
under globalization between territoriality/geography, institutions, and social
structures. The crucial question here is the ways in which globalization may
be transforming the spatial dynamics of accumulation and the institutional
arrangements through which it takes place. The subject – literally, that is, the
agents/makers of the social world – is not global space but people in those spaces.
What is central, therefore, is a spatial reconfiguration of social relations
beyond a nation-state/inter-state framework, if not indeed even beyond
territory.
States are institutionalized social relations and territorial actors to the
extent that those social relations are territorialized. Nation-states are social
relations that have historically been territorialized but those relations are not
by definition territorial. To the extent that the US and other national states
promote deterritorializing social and economic processes they are not territorial actors. The US state can hardly be considered as acting territorially
when it promotes the global relocation of accumulation processes that were
previously concentrated in US territory. Harvey’s approach is at odds to
explain such behavior since by his definition the US state must promote its
own territorial aggrandizement. Harvey observes that as local banking was
supplanted by national banking in the development of capitalism “the free
flow of money capital across the national space altered regional dynamics.”25
In the same vein we can argue that the free flow of capital across global space
alters these dynamics on a worldwide scale.
Let us return to the question: why would Harvey propose separate logics
for the economic and the political – for capital and the state? By separating
23)
24)
25)

Castells 1996.
Giddens 1990.
Harvey 2003, p. 106.
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the political and the economic he is able to claim that indeed globalization has transformed the spatial dynamics of accumulation – hence capital
globalizes – but that the institutional arrangements of such global accumulation remain territorial as nation-states. The state has its own independent
logic that brings it into an external relation to globalizing capital. Here we
arrive at the pitfall of theoreticism. If one starts with the theoretical assumption that the world is made up of independent, territorial-based nation states
and that this particular institutional-political form is something immanent
to the modern world – Wood makes the assumption explicit, a law of capitalism; for Harvey it seems implicit – then the changing world of the 21st century
must be explained by theoretical fiat in these terms. Reality must be made to
conform to the theoretical conception of an immutable nation-state based,
inter-state political and institutional order. But since Harvey acknowledges
the reality of globalizing capital he is therefore forced to separate the logic of
that globalizing capital from that of territorially-based states; he is forced
either to abandon the theoretical construct altogether or to build it upon a
dualism of the economic and the political, of capital and the state.
Theory needs to illuminate reality, not make reality conform to it. The
pitfall of this theoreticism is to develop analyses and propositions to fit theoretical assumptions. Since received theories establish a frame of an inter-state
system made up of competing national states, economies and capitals then
21st century reality must be interpreted so that it fits this frame one way or
another. Such theoreticism forces theorists of the “new imperialism” into a
schizophrenic dualism of economic and political logics. In any event Harvey
has trapped himself in a blind alley that underscores the pitfall. Despite his
acknowledgement of capital’s transnationalization he concludes that the US
state’s political/territorial logic is driven now by an effort to open up space
vis-à-vis competitor nation-states for unloading national capital surplus,
hence the new US imperialism. This inconsistency in Harvey’s argumentation reflects a general contradiction in the “new imperialism” literature: the
dualism of the economic and political, of capital and the state, is negated by
the claim that the US state functions to serve (US national) capital.

Global Capitalism and the TNS
“New imperialism” theories analyze US foreign policy in relation to the realist assumption of competition among national capitals and consequent political and military rivalry among core nation-states. “The US forces open
capital markets around the world [to bring] specific advantages . . . to US

SWB 2,1_f3_5-26.indd 16

https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol2/iss1/2
DOI: 101163/187188607X163176

1/8/07 1:04:00 PM

12

Robinson: Beyond the Theory of Imperialism: Global Capitalism and the Trans

W. I. Robinson / Societies Without Borders 2 (2007) 5–26

17

financial institutions,” asserts Harvey. The United States engages in heightened interventionism to offset its hegemonic decline, says Arrighi26 “Intercapitalist rivalry remains the hub of the imperialist wheel,” claims Foster. “In
the present period of global hegemonic imperialism the United States is
geared above all to expanding its imperial power to whatever extent possible
and subordinating the rest of the capitalist world to its interests.”27 Henwood
insists that US foreign policy in recent years has been singularly aimed at the
restoration of the relative strength of “American” capitalists;28 and “The
European Union,” writes Wood, “is potentially a stronger economic power
than the U.S.”29
Yet, to interrogate Wood’s affirmation, empirical study of the global economy reveals that transnational corporations operate both inside as well outside of the territorial bounds of the EU, that transnational investors from all
countries hold and trade in trillions of euros and dollars each day, that European investors are as deeply integrated into transnational circuits of accumulation that inextricably pass through the “US” economy as are US investors
into such circuits that pass through the “EU” economy. These transnational
capitalists operate across US–EU frontiers and have a material and political
interest in stabilizing the “US” and the “EU” economy and “their” financial
institutions. Once we belie the realist notion of a world of national economies
and national capitals then the logical sequence in “new imperialism” argumentation collapses like a house of cards since the whole edifice is constructed
on this notion. By coming to grips with the reality of transnational capital we
can grasp US foreign policy in its organic relation to the actual structure and
composition of the dominant social forces in the global capitalist system.
My claim that a TNS apparatus is emerging does not imply that supranational institutions such as the IMF or the WTO replace or – in Wood’s
words – “make irrelevant” the national state. Rather, the national state is
being transformed and increasingly absorbed functionally into a larger transnational institutional structure that involves complex new relations between
national states and supra or transnational institutions, on the one hand, and
diverse class and social forces, on the other. As national states are captured by
transnational capitalist forces they tend to serve the interests of global over
local accumulation processes. The TNS, for instance, has played a key role in

26)
27)
28)
29)

Arrighi 2005; see also Wallerstein 2006.
Foster 2003, p. 13.
Henwood 2003.
Wood 2003, p. 156.
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imposing the neo-liberal model on the old Third World and therefore in
reinforcing the class relations of global capitalism.
Few commentators suggest that the nation-state is disappearing, or that
capital can now, or ever has been able to, exist without a state. The observation by Wood and others that global capital needs (local) states is neither
original nor particularly controversial. I, among others, have argued for many
years that a fundamental contradiction of global capitalism is that for historic reasons economic globalization has unfolded within the political/
authority framework of a nation-state system. The real issue is not whether
global capitalism can dispense with the state – it cannot. Rather, it is that the
state may be in a process of transformation in consort with the restructuring
and transformation of world capitalism. The question is, to what extent and
in what ways may new state forms and institutional configurations be emerging, and how may we theorize these new configurations?
There are vital functions that the national state performs for transnational
capital, among them, sets of local economic policies aimed at achieving macroeconomic equilibrium, the provision of property laws, infrastructure, and
of course, social control and ideological reproduction. However, national
states are ill equipped to organize a supranational unification of macroeconomic policies, create a unified field for transnational capital to operate,
impose transnational trade regimes, supranational “transparency,” and so
forth. The construction of a supranational legal and regulator system for the
global economy in recent years has been the task of sets of transnational institutions whose policy prescriptions and actions have been synchronized with
those of neo-liberal national state that have been captured by local transnationally-oriented forces.
A transnational institutional structure has played an increasingly salient
role in coordinating global capitalism and imposing capitalist domination
beyond national borders. Clearly the IMF, by imposing a structural adjustment program that opens up a given country to the penetration of transnational capital, the subordination of local labor, and the extraction of wealth
by transnational capitalists, is operating as a state institution to facilitate the
exploitation of local labor by global capital. “New imperialism” dogma
reduces these IMF practices to instruments of “US” imperialism.30 Yet I
know of no single IMF structural adjustment program that creates conditions in the intervened country that favors “US” capital in any special way,

30)

For example, see Bello 2005; Gowan 1999; Wood 2003.
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rather than opening up the intervened country, its labor and resources, to
capitalists from any corner of the world.
US foreign policy is exercised behind the backs of the public by state managers as proximate policymakers and politicized corporate elites that constitute the ruling class in the formal sense of the term. Nevertheless, state
policymaking is also a process in which different factions and institutions
that make up the state apparatus have influence over varied quotas of decision-making at given moments. Tactical and strategic differences as well as
personal and institutional rivalries are played out at the level of proximate
policymaking in disputes for control over policy. This diffusion of foreign
policy making power within an elite and levels of (relative) autonomy among
proximate policymakers can make moments of transition and redefinition
appear highly contradictory and can confuse observers, especially when these
observers that take public discourse at face value or assume that social actors
are not influenced by ideologies that may be in contradiction with interests
and underlying intent.

The Crisis of Global Capitalism and the US State
“US” imperialism refers to the use by transnational elites of the US state
apparatus to continue to attempt to expand, defend and stabilize the global
capitalist system. We face an empire of global capital, as I have argued elsewhere,31 headquartered, for evident historical reasons, in Washington. The
questions for global elites are: In what ways, under what particular conditions, arrangements, and strategies should US state power be wielded? How
can particular sets of US state managers be responsive and held accountable
to global elites who are fractious in their actions, dispersed around the world,
and operating through numerous supranational institutional settings, each
with distinct histories and particular trajectories?
We are witness to new forms of global capitalist domination, whereby
intervention is intended to create conditions favorable to the penetration of
transnational capital and the renewed integration of the intervened region
into the global system. US intervention facilitates a shift in power from
locally and regionally-oriented elites to new groups more favorable to the
transnational project. The result of US military conquest is not the creation

31)

Robinson 2004, 2005b.
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of exclusive zones for “US” exploitation, as was the result of the Spanish conquest of Latin America, the British of South Africa and India, the Dutch of
Indonesia, and so forth, in earlier moments of the world capitalist system.
The enhanced class power of capital brought about by these changes is felt
around the world. We see not a reenactment of this old imperialism but the
colonization and recolonization of the vanquished for the new global capitalism and its agents. The underlying class relation between the TCC and
the US national state needs to be understood in these terms.
In sum, the US state has attempted to play a leadership role on behalf of
transnational capitalist interests. That it is increasingly unable to do so points
not to heightened national rivalry but to the impossibility of the task at hand
given a spiraling crisis of global capitalism. This crisis involves three interrelated dimensions. First is a crisis of social polarization. The system cannot
meet the needs of a majority of humanity, or even assure minimal social
reproduction. Second is a structural crisis of overaccumulation. The system
cannot expand because the marginalization of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages
and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarization of income, has
reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. The problem of surplus absorption makes state-driven military spending and the
growth of military-industrial complexes an outlet for surplus and gives the
current global order a built-in war drive. Third is a crisis of legitimacy and
authority. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into
question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and
is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges.
This multidimensional crisis of global capitalism has generated intense
discrepancies and disarray within the globalist ruling bloc. The opposition
of France, Germany and other countries to the Iraq invasion indicated sharp
tactical and strategic differences over how to respond to crisis, shore up the
system, and keep it expanding. The political coherence of ruling groups
always frays when faced with structural and/or legitimacy crises as different
groups push distinct strategies and tactics or turn to the more immediate
pursuit of sectoral interests. Faced with the increasingly dim prospects of
constructing a viable transnational hegemony, in the Gramscian sense of a
stable system of consensual domination, the transnational bourgeoisie has
not collapsed back into the nation-state. Global elites have, instead, mustered
up fragmented and at times incoherent responses involving heightened military coercion, the search for a post-Washington consensus, and acrimonious
internal disputes. The more politically astute among global elites have clam-
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ored in recent years to promote a “post-Washington consensus” project of
reform – a so-called “globalization with a human face” – in the interests of
saving the system itself.32 But there were other from within and outside of the
bloc that called for more radical responses.
Neo-liberalism “peacefully” forced open new areas for global capital in
the 1980s and the 1990s. This was often accomplished through economic
coercion alone, made possible by the structural power of the global economy
over individual countries. But this structural power became less effective in
the face of the three-pronged crisis mentioned above. Opportunities for both
intensive and extensive expansion have been drying up as privatizations ran
their course, the “socialist” countries became integrated, the consumption of
high-income sectors worldwide reached ceilings, spending through private
credit expansion could not be sustained, and so on. The space for “peaceful”
expansion, both intensive and extensive, has become ever more restricted.
Military aggression becomes an instrument for prying open new sectors and
regions, for the forcible restructuring of space in order to further accumulation. The train of neo-liberalism became latched on to military intervention
and the threat of coercive sanctions as a locomotive for pulling the moribund
Washington consensus forward. The “war on terrorism” provides a seemingly endless military outlet for surplus capital, generates a colossal deficit
that justifies the ever-deeper dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state and
locks neo-liberal austerity in place, and legitimates the creation of a police
state to repress political dissent in the name of security.
In the post 9/11 period the military dimension appears to exercise an
over-determining influence in the reconfiguration of global politics. The
Bush White House militarized social and economic contradictions, launching a permanent war mobilization to try to stabilize the system through
direct coercion. Is this evidence for a new US bid for empire? We need to
move beyond a conjunctural focus on the Bush regime to grasp the current
moment and the US role in it. In this sense, interventionism and militarized
globalization is less a campaign for US hegemony than a contradictory political response to the crisis of global capitalism – to economic stagnation,
legitimation problems, and the rise of counterhegemonic forces.
Despite the rhetoric of neo-liberalism, the US state is undertaking an
almost unprecedented role in creating profit-making opportunities for
transnational capital and pushing forward an accumulation process that left

32)

For example, see Stiglitz 2002.
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to its own devices (the “free market”) would likely ground to a halt. A Pentagon budget of nearly $500 billion in 2003, an invasion and occupation of
Iraq with a price tag of over $300 billion by 2006 and a proposed multibillion dollar space program that would rest on a marriage of NASA, the
military, and an array of private corporate interests must be seen in this
light. Some have seen the $300 billion invested by the US state in the
first three years of its Iraq invasion and occupation as evidence that the US
intervention benefits “US capital” to the detriment of other national – e.g.,
“EU” – capitals. However, Bechtel, the Carlyle Group, and Halliburton are
themselves transnational capital conglomerates.33 It is true that military, oil,
and engineering/construction companies, many of them headquartered in
the United States, have managed to secure their particular sectoral interests
through brazen instrumentalization of the US state under the Bush presidency. However, these companies are themselves transnational and their
interests are those not of “US capital” in rivalry with other countries but of
particular transnational clusters in the global economy.
The “creative destruction” of war (and natural and humanitarian disasters) generates new cycles of accumulation through “reconstruction.” And
the military-energy-engineering-construction complex constitutes one of
those sectors of global capital that most benefits from such “creative destruction.” Transnational capitalists are themselves aware of the role of the US
state in opening up new possibilities for unloading of surplus and created
new investment opportunities. “We’re looking for places to invest around
the world,” explained one former executive of a Dutch-based oil exploration
and engineering company, and then “you know, along comes Iraq.”34
The $300 billion invested by the US state in war and “reconstruction” in
Iraq between 2003 and 2006 went to a vast array of investors and subcontractors that spanned the globe.35 Kuwaiti Trading and Contracting,
Alargan Trading of Kuwait, Gulf Catering and Saudi Trading and Construction Company were just some of the Middle East-based companies that
shared in the bonanza, along with companies and investor groups as far away
as South Africa, Bosnia, the Philippines, and India. The picture that emerges
is one in which the US state mobilizes the resources to feed a vast transnational network of profit making that passes through countless layers of

33)
34)
35)

See, e.g., Brody 2003.
As cited in Monthly Review 2004, p. 64.
Phinney 2005.
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outsourcing, subcontracting, alliances and collaborative relations, benefiting
transnationally-oriented capitalists from many parts of the globe. The US
state is the pivotal gear in a TNS machinery dedicated to reproducing global
capitalism.

Concluding Comments: Imperialism and the Extensive and Intensive
Enlargement of Capitalism
If the world is not divided into rival national economies and national capitals, do we still need a theory of imperialism? Is there any contemporary relevance to the concept? In the post-WWII period, and drawing on the
tradition established by Rosa Luxembourg, Marxists and other critical political economists shifted the main focus in the study of imperialism to the
mechanisms of core capitalist penetration of Third World countries and the
appropriation of their surpluses. Imperialism in this sense referred to this
exploitation and also to the use of state apparatuses by capitals emanating
from the centers of the world system to facilitate this economic relation
through military, political, and cultural mechanisms. If we mean by imperialism the relentless pressures for outward expansion of capitalism and the
distinct political, military and cultural mechanisms that facilitate that
expansion and the appropriation of surpluses it generates then it is a structural imperative built into capitalism; not a policy of particular core state
managers (to see it as such was Hobson’s fallacy) but a practice immanent to
the system itself.
We need tools to conceptualize, analyze, and theorize how this expansionary pressure built into the capitalist system manifests itself in the age of
globalization. We need these tools politically so as to help make effective our
confrontation with the system. I would agree to this extent with Kiely that a
theory of imperialism “remains indispensable for understanding both the
contemporary world order and the place of the South in that order.”36 Yet,
even at that, capitalist imperialism is considerably more complex under globalization that the facile North-South/core-periphery framework through
which it is typically viewed. The class relations of global capitalism are now
so deeply internalized within every nation-state that the classical image
of imperialism as a relation of external domination is outdated.37 Failure to
36)
37)

Kiely 2006.
Robinson 2006a.
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comprehend this leads to such superficial and misleading conclusions as, for
instance, that the failure of popular projects to materialize under the rule of
the Workers Party in Brazil or the African National Congress in South Africa
is a result of a “sell out” by the leaders of those parties or simply because
“imperialism” undercut their programs. Imperialism is not about nations but
about groups exercising the social power – through institutions – to control
value production, to appropriate surpluses, and to reproduce these arrangements. The challenge for such a theoretical enterprise is to ask: how and
by whom in the world capitalist system are values produced (organized
through what institutions), how are they appropriated (through what institutions), and how are these processes changing through capitalist globalization? During the 500 years since the genesis of the world capitalist system,
colonialism and imperialism coercively incorporated zones and peoples into
its fold. This historical process of “primitive accumulation” is coming to a
close.
The end of the extensive enlargement of capitalism is the end of the imperialist era of world capitalism. The system still conquers space, nature, and
human beings. It is dehumanizing, genocidal, suicidal, and maniacal. But
with the exception of a few remaining spaces – Iraq until recently, North
Korea, etc. – the world has been brought into the system over the past half
millennium. The implacable logic of accumulation is now largely internal to
worldwide social relations and to the complex of fractious political institutions through which ruling groups attempt to manage those relations. We
therefore need a theory of capitalist expansion – of the political processes and
the institutions through which such expansion takes place, the class relations
and spatial dynamics it involves.
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